For a short
opinion involving only $17,000 or so worth of money, there is a lot going on in in In re
Hill, 210 B.R. 1016 (1997), not the least of which is
enough discussions of “dragnet”
clauses to repeatedly prompt someone to remember Joe Friday’s admonition, so we
will begin with just the facts:
The Hills
borrowed money from the bank and gave the bank a mortgage, securing the debt
with their homestead and a vacant lot. That was in 1993. The mortgage contained a clause that said:
This
Mortgage secures prompt payment to Lender of (a) the sum stated in the first
paragraph of this Mortgage, plus interest and charges according to the terms of
the promissory notes or agreement of Borrower to Lender identified on the
reverse side, and any extensions, renewals or modifications of such promissory
notes or agreement, (b) to the extent not prohibited by the Wisconsin Consumer
Act (i) any additional sums which are in the future loaned by Lender to any
Mortgagor, to any Mortgagor and another or to another guaranteed or endorsed by
any Mortgagor primarily for personal, family, or household purpose and agreed
in documents evidencing the transaction to be secured by this Mortgage, and
(ii) all other additional sums which are in the future loaned by Lender to any
Mortgagor, to any Mortgagor and another or to another guaranteed or endorsed by
any Mortgagor, (c) all interest and charges, and (d) to the extent not
prohibited by law costs and expenses of collection or enforcement (all called
the "Obligations"). This Mortgage also secures the performance of all
covenants, conditions and agreements contained in this Mortgage.
Before that, the Hills had gotten a Mastercard from the bank, with a credit
limit of $5,000.
Following the mortgage,
the Hills opened “Ready Reserve” accounts, which were essentially lines of
credit for overdraft protection.
The
reserve account agreements said:
The
Loan Balance and Finance Charges are or may be secured by a lien upon any
credit balance or other money now or hereafter owed to Borrower by Bank, and by
all security agreements of Borrower now or hereafter held or acquired by Bank.
Then, the Hills borrowed money to get a car, and the Note for that said
that:
Lender
may, at any time after the occurrence of an event of default and notice and
opportunity to cure, if required by § 425.105, Wis. Stats., set-off any amount
unpaid on the Obligations against any deposit balances I may at any time have
with Lender, or other money now or hereafter owed me by Lender. This Agreement
is also secured (to the extent not prohibited by the Wisconsin Consumer Act) by
all existing and future security agreements between Lender and any of us,
between Lender and any guarantor or indorser of this Agreement, and between Lender
and any other person providing collateral security for my Obligations. However,
this Agreement is not secured by any principal dwelling unless described in
this Agreement.
Got all that? What happened next is that the debtors sold
the vacant lot, with the Bank’s consent, and the Bank, claiming the Hills
didn’t care how it applied the $17,000 in proceeds did this:
(1) $9,182.22 was applied to the debtors' MasterCard credit card debt;
(2) $4,935.62 was applied to the debtors' two Ready Reserve Accounts;
(3) $1,260.67 was applied to the debtors' delinquent real estate taxes on
their homestead; (4) $612.74 was applied to the debtors' vehicle loan with the
Bank; and
(5) $1,262.36 was applied to the debtors' Mortgage Note.
It’s tempting to think that banks started behaving with a callous disregard
towards customers only after the mortgage crisis of the first decade of the 21
st
century; but this took place in 1997 or so, with the Bank deliberately leaving
its debtors – who had a longstanding relationship with them – at risk of losing
their home
even though the debtors paid
down their debts by $17,000+.
Food
for thought.
The debtors then filed for chapter 7 bankruptcy, and the trustee moved to
recover the $17,000 as a preference, under a variety of theories.
It all boiled down to this, though: how
enforceable are dragnet clauses both in general and under the Wisconsin
Consumer Act?
The Hill court gave the matter some
thoughtful consideration, noting that Wisconsin had previously ruled that
dragnets needed to be related to debts contemplated at the time of entering
into the agreement, and that to make that decision you first look towards the
terms of the agreement itself:
Thus, the antecedent liability of the
debtors must be stated in clear terms and the subsequent liabilities must
either relate to a similar course of financing or fall within the expressed
intent of the parties.
The Court
then determined that since the Mastercard debt predated the dragnets, it had to
be clearly identified in the documents; it was not, and so the payment of the
credit card was a preferential transfer (the result of that being the Bank
would be required to pay that money to the Trustee, who would use it to pay
claims.)
The reserve
accounts and the car loan both contained language that included them in the
mortgage debt – so the Court had to look to see whether the debts were “related”
or not. The test for “relatedness” turns
out to boil down to “is it business or is
it personal,” despite a bunch of words devoted to how to determine that,
and because these were all personal debts, the two factors (dragnet clause + relatedness) were
met. The overdraft protections and the
car loan were secured by the mortgage and therefore the payments were not
preferential transfers.
(Food for
thought, two: In the past, banks required checking accounts to have a minimum
balance. They then eliminated that and instead had overdraft fees. Now, banks allow you to open lines of credit
to cover bad checks and charge interest instead, and secure that protection by
your primary residence in a voluntary lien that is not dischargeable in
bankruptcy. Is that progress?)
The trustee
had one final challenge to those overdraft loans, arguing (correctly) that the
Wisconsin Consumer Act prohibits taking a security interest in a debtor’s
homestead to secure debts of less than $1,000, and pointing out that the
transactions on the Mastercard and overdraft accounts were each likely less
than $1,000; but the interpretation of what is a “transaction” has always
provided that it’s the total amount owed at the time of the enforcement that is
important, including finance and other permitted charges. Since the amount owed on those balances was
greater than $1,000 at the time of enforcement, the exclusion on liens did not
apply.
(Food for
thought, three: Could a creditor let an overdraft balance of, say, $600, grow
over time to be more than $1,000 with late fees and penalties and allow it to
be secured, then?)