Part one of this review of the recently-decided Wendy M. "Same-sex couples can't both be parents" case is here.
Part two of this review of the case is here.

Do you need a compelling reason to want to parent your kids? If you gave birth to them, or married the woman who gave birth to them,
no. But if you're prohibited from marrying your kid's biological or adoptive parent, then
... yes.
Those are the only measuring sticks we use in Wisconsin, mind you. When we decide whether someone can be a parent, the tests are:
1.
Can they impregnate someone or get pregnant? If so, they can be a parent.2.
If they can't do one or the other of those things, can they marry someone who can? If so, they can be a parent.3.
If they can't do either 1 or 2, then they can only be a parent if nobody they love is also
a parent to that child.Note that no part of the test to
become a parent asks anything like "
are you a maniac who will ask a 10 year old to babysit your toddler for an entire day?" We, as Wisconsinites, don't care to keep people like that from
becoming parents, just as we won't do
anything if
a father accidentally shoots his 8-year-old son in the chest-- "accidentally" meaning
he had a loaded, unlocked, unsafetied rifle in a house with an 8-year-old and was getting it out when the kid was around. That guy gets to
become a parent, and
stay a parent -- albeit not of that 8-year-old, anymore.
Not so with people who happen to love someone of the same sex as themselves; in Wendy M's. case, having decided that Wendy wasn't a parent (and having
upheld a ruling that Wisconsin judges aren't smart enough to apply tests used by other states), the Court of Appeals next considered Wendy's argument that there might be
compelling reasons she should be allowed parent-like rights and access to her children.
Under
Barstad v. Frazier, a 'third-party' can win custodial rights from a parent of a child if
compelling reasons exist to make that decision. Note, again, that this is a rule that requires that
only one person have the right to make a decision about a child
in some circumstances. In family law cases involving
heterosexual couples, courts routinely apply a presumption that
joint custody is to be granted-- giving equal power and rights to parents in all but the worst situations. But in
same sex relationships, the state has no desire or power to let two women, or two men, share that decision making authority.
Wendy M. argued that the
compelling reasons to give her custodial (guardianship) rights existed primarily because Liz, her partner, had first fostered a relationship between Wendy and the kids, then refused to allow it to continue; the drastic alteration of Wendy's participation in the children's lives, Wendy argued, was a compelling reason to allow Wendy, not Liz, to make the decision about how Wendy should be involved.
In a
single paragraph, the Court of Appeals shot that down:
Wendy’s argument that compelling reasons exist is based on an out-of-context interpretation of the phrase “other similar extraordinary circumstances that would drastically affect the welfare of the child.” The Barstad standard is not concerned with detrimental affects to the child caused by the end of the relationship with a person, like Wendy, who is a third party to the child under Barstad. The Barstad standard applies only to circumstances caused by the biological or adoptive parent drastically affecting the child’s welfare that might justify the award of custody (or guardianship) to a third party. Barstad sets forth the circumstances that must exist before the state may infringe upon the rights of a biological or adoptive parent’s rights to make decisions regarding the care, custody and control of the parent’s children. These circumstances, under Barstad, include abandonment, neglect, disruption of parental custody or other extraordinary circumstances caused by the biological or adoptive parent. Wendy makes no allegation that Liz meets any of these criteria. Thus, there are no triable factual issues concerning whether compelling reasons exist under Barstad to justify granting Wendy’s guardianship petitions over Liz’s objection.Read the highlighted portions -- I added those-- carefully, because the Court of Appeals said that Wendy took the "other extraordinary circumstances" factor out of context, but
didn't say how. If you want the answer to
that, you've got to go back to
Barstad, which I did.
In
Barstad, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin began with its holding, simply put:
We hold that unless the court finds that the parent is unfit or unable to care for the child or that there are compelling reasons for denying custody to the parent, the court must grant custody to the child's parent.That seems to say that there are
two ways for a third party to wrest custody from a parent: prove the parent is unfit,
or prove that "
there are compelling reasons for denying custody to the parent." In
Barstad, the Court ruled that the petitioner -- the child's grandma -- hadn't proven compelling reasons for taking away custody of the child from mom.
The kid had been born to a 16-year-old mom, and then raised in part by mom and part by grandma for four years. After that, mom moved in with a friend, then married, then divorced and moved back in with grandma, then moved in with a friend again; that all took place in 7 years, until grandma filed an action seeking custody. Home studies showed both parties were fit (or, put another way, declared neither to be
unfit.)
Grandma won custody of the child -- based on "
the present stability which the grandmother has given and which is reflected in the happy, well-adjusted boy ... as contrasted to the unknown future of Wanda Frazier... although Wanda Frazier is not an unfit person to have custody of the minor child, the present stability and happiness of this young boy should not be exchanged for the unknown."
It's not clear, but it seems, from reading the opinion, that the child
always lived with mom -- and that grandma had the boy only when mom lived with grandma. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed the circuit court and Court of Appeals' decision, focusing exclusively on whether
compelling reasons,
not unfitness, existed to give grandma custody; remember, both parents had been determined to be fit: "
In this case the trial court found Wanda Frazier to be both fit and able to have the care and custody of Michael. That finding is supported by the record. Therefore the trial court's judgment can be upheld only if there are compelling reasons justifying an award of custody to Theol Barstad."
The Court reviewed the history of these types of cases -- one in which an apparently-devoted dad who was in the military got custody over a grandparents' objections, and one in which a dad who had essentially abandoned the kids lost custody to the grandparents after his ex-wife (the mom) died. Then, having at length expounded on the history and reasons and constitutional underpinnings of the rule, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin ruled as follows:
We conclude that the facts of this case do not evidence compelling reasons for an award of custody to Michael's grandmother. Therefore the decision of the court of appeals is reversed and custody of Michael Frazier is ordered transferred to his mother Wanda Frazier.Nice. Nice and concise. Completely lacking in persuasive authority, but very concise. Brevity is both the soul of wit, and of custodial determinations, apparently.
Remember, though, how I said it was not clear where the kid lived and with whom? That's only true if you rely solely on the majority's opinion. In the dissent, Justice Steinmetz sets out more details:
According to the testimony of Theol A. Barstad, the grandmother, and Wanda K. Frazier, the mother of Michael, the boy was born on November 24, 1973, and has lived outside of the grandmother's home for only six months, except for the time after birth when he lived with his mother and her father for about two months and with his mother and her brother for less than a month. Michael was approximately eight years of age at the time of the custody hearing on December 21 and 30, 1981, and is now about ten and one-half years. During his eight years he has:
(1) lived outside of the grandmother's house for approximately six months;(2) lived in the grandmother's house with his mother also living there for approximately four and one-half years;
(3) lived in the grandmother's house while his mother lived elsewhere for close to three years.
He has now lived in his grandmother's house without his mother living there since April, May or June of 1980. The parties differed in their testimony as to who was involved in the daily care of Michael while they all lived in the grandmother's house. However, during that period of time, the mother worked nights and she testified that she saw Michael only for an hour a day in the morning before he went to school and during weekends. The grandmother testified that from February, 1974, to February, 1977, she was primarily responsible for meeting Michael's physical needs and that from August, 1977, to the time of the hearing, she and her husband had been primarily responsible for raising Michael and meeting his physical needs. Michael's mother admitted to attending only one parent-teacher conference at his school. The grandmother testified that she attended the balance of such meetings.Said Justice Steinmetz, in arguing that Grandma should win: "We do not have a mother in the instant case who has raised her child."
Justice Steinmetz then addressed the Court's fears that wealth would always trump biology -- and in doing so, actually complimented Wisconsin's circuit judges, for a change:
The plaintiff in the present case, the grandmother, receives Aid for Dependent Children to support Michael. Therefore, the majority's fear of the wealthy prevailing if the best interest of the child test is applied is unfounded in this case. When the situation arises that there is a contest between wealth of a third party and the minimal financial ability of a parent, then the trial court can address it, and it is doubtful whether any trial judge in this state would award custody on the basis of wealth. This mother is supported by her male friend with whom she lives. He has not been employed since August, 1981, and lives on separation funds. This man has no legal obligation to support either Michael or his mother and the relationship can end anytime he chooses. Therefore, the decision of the trial court did not involve financial advantage of minimum economic circumstances.So the only
real explanation of the facts which support (or don't support) a finding of compelling circumstances sufficient to take custody from a parent and give it to a third party exists in the
dissent to the
Barstad case, as neither the majority in
Barstad nor the majority in
Wendy M bothered to say
why the facts didn't measure up.
But nonexplanation appears to be the rule of the day in
Wendy M, as the Court of Appeals finished up by dealing summarily with Wendy's constitutional arguments: It found the 3 pages Wendy devoted to them in her brief ("
much of which does not focus on her equal protection and due process arguments")
to be inadequate and therefore did not address the arguments at all -- so the Court of Appeals didn't have to explain why Wendy's constitutional arguments couldn't win because Wendy didn't explain why they
should win.
In the end,
Wendy M loses not because of anything the Court of Appeals did right, or wrong; it's an error-correcting court that
can, but isn't supposed to, make law, and in this case the Court followed the dictates of decades of ill-explained Wisconsin rulings that have made clear that same-sex parents can't really be
parents. Whether Wendy M will appeal to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin remains to be seen -- she's got about 9 more days, as I write this, to do so. But there's no reason to think she'll fare any better there than anyone else has, and no reason to think the Courts will do a better job of explaining why they're making the decisions they make, as opposed to summarily ruling one way or the other.
The real problem is that the state -- by which I mean
us -- has to decide which is more of a priority. Is it more important that we let kids have two parents making decisions for them and being involved in their lives, even if the two parents are the same sex? Or is it more important that we force these kinds of uncomfortable decisions on courts just to keep Heather from having two mommies? A review of
any decision of this type keeps poking the reader in the eye with the discomforting fact that the criteria by which we decide who can become, or stay, a parent, is arbitrary (at best) -- but until the legislature and voters decide to
stop being arbitrary, courts will have no choice but to keep imposing these rules.