Day 28 of
30 Days of Debt Collection, and I'm going to answer some questions.
Reader
True Q asked two questions in recent days that raise good, interesting issues. As a lawyer, I love good, interesting issues. (Clients, and potential clients, you should
hate good, interesting issues, because "
interesting" equals
expensive in the law. You don't want your lawyer to say
that's interesting because that means the question is a new one, or the outcome is uncertain, or something else that'll cost you money. You want your lawyer to say
oh, yeah, I've seen this a million times. I know just how to handle this. It won't be expensive.)
So, True Q's questions:
In response to
my post on hot air balloons and deceptive ads, True Q asks:
Can 100.18 apply to representations by debt collectors? The answer is,
I don't see why not. Section 100.18, remember, is the law that prohibits deceptive representations. The key question would be whether the
debt collector met the
elements of the law.
The
elements of a law are the facts that need to be proven to show that the law was violated.
Elements are like a checklist for whether there's been a violation.
The
elements of a violation of Wisconsin's section 100.18 are these: (1) the defendant made a representation to “the public” with the intent to induce an obligation; (2) the representation was untrue, deceptive, or misleading; and (3) the representation caused the plaintiff a pecuniary loss.
There's details in there that could fill a whole post, like who's
the public and what's
pecuniary loss, and those are worth discussing, but not today. The big question is:
If a debt collector meets those criteria, can he or she be sued under section 100.18? The answer is,
probably.(You knew a lawyer would say that, right?) I have to say
probably because there may be limits in the law, placed by public policy (
i.e., the courts) that keep debt collectors from being liable for violating that section -- that is, the law may not apply even though it seems it should.

And I say
probably because I'm not aware of any debt collector ever having been sued under that law. So I can think of situations where section 100.18 would apply, and a debtor could sue under that law, but I don't know yet whether it would work.
What I do know is that there's little reason to sue a debt collector under section 100.18 -- at least so far as I can imagine. Section 100.18 is actually
less powerful than the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). Section 100.18 lets you get the pecuniary loss -- damages you've suffered, say, money you've paid. And it lets you get attorney's fees.
But the FDCPA lets you get both of those,
and "statutory damages," money you can get even if you're not harmed, up to $1,000. And, you can get emotional distress damages under the FDCPA, but probably not under section 100.18.
The one benefit I can think of would be that section 100.18 has a three-year statute of limitations, while the FDCPA's statute is one year. So if you've discovered a violation, and it's more than a year old, section 100.18 might provide
some benefits to you, if a debt collector otherwise meets the
elements.True Q's question, though, is a good one, because it's important for lawyers (and clients, and you) to think creatively, especially because each law does provide certain benefits or detriments. The FDCPA provides more benefits, but a shorter time line to sue and gives the Court the right to award fees to your opponent at times. Section 100.18 gives you fewer remedies, but a longer time to sue and doesn't have as easy of a time letting your opponent ask for fees if she wins.
And
that is why you hire a lawyer-- because we are in a position to help you make those determinations about which laws to use and when. And, ideally, you hire a lawyer sooner (now!) rather than later.
Next question! True Q says, in response to
my post about damages and the FDCPA, that what's really bothering
him is lawyers claiming First Amendment rights to say they are a lawyer and/or a law firm in Wisconsin when they're not.
Now, that's not technically a question, but it did raise
interesting issues, so I thought I'd tackle it as my final
30 Days of Debt post (actual number of entries: 28; actual length of time covered by
30 Days of Debt: 107.)
I'm not a 1st Amendment lawyer (although I am an avid proponent of speech, especially about law and football.)
I also don't know the exact situation that True Q is talking about. But my lack of knowledge doesn't keep me from opining on this subject, which is this:
Would the First Amendment protect from liability under the FDCPA a lawyer who lies about his legal status in the course of collecting a debt?My gut feeling -- almost never wrong, when it comes to the law -- is
no. But I've never looked into it, so let me do what lawyers do, and research that a bit. (
Research is one reason why
interesting= expensive. When lawyers don't know the answer to a question, we look to see if someone, somewhere, has answered that question. And we bill you for that. So if you're reading this, send me a dollar.)
Wait a bit. I'll be back.
Okay.
Here's what I've found.
In the case of
Basile v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore LLC, 632 F.Supp.2d 842, a federal court listened to the arguments of a debt collector claiming a First Amendment right to file state court lawsuits against a debtor. The debtor said that the lawsuits were beyond the statute of limitations (
see my post on Zombie Debt, here) and had other problems. The law firm said
Wait, we have a First Amendment right to file lawsuits, under the "right to petition" found in the First Amendment.
(No doubt the Founding Fathers envisioned a series of collection lawsuits when drafting that Amendment.)
Because they have a protected First Amendment right to petition their government, the law firm reasoned, the FDCPA couldn't prohibit that; the FDCPA, in that respect, they said, was
unconstitutional.They were wrong; the Court (and other courts that have looked at this) have rejected that argument, mostly because the U.S. Supreme Court has said that lawyers are covered by the FDCPA if they're debt collectors, too.
So the First Amendment doesn't keep a lawyer from being sued for filing a time-barred lawsuit. Does that extend to other claims that FDCPA-violating actions are First-Amendment-Protected rights? Probably (
again!)... That is,
the First Amendment probably doesn't protect a debt collector who falsely represents his status while collecting a debt, not just because the First Amendment has already been held (in that case, above, and others) to not protect debt collectors who file improper lawsuits, but also because, in general, the First Amendment doesn't provide as many protections to
commercial speech.That's why states can prohibit false advertising, among other things.
Commercial speech -- things you're saying for money -- isn't at the heart of the First Amendment, so it can be regulated slightly more easily, than, say,
political speech.To put it another way: If you want to say
I hate the president, you generally can do that anytime you want without regulation. If you want to say
The president personally hired me to collect this debt, well, that can be regulated because it's
commercially, not politically, motivated.
Or, as the U.S. Supreme Court said:
Although commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment, not all regulation of such speech is unconstitutional...[W]e articulated a test for determining whether a particular commercial speech regulation is constitutionally permissible. Under that test we ask as a threshold matter whether the commercial speech concerns unlawful activity or is misleading. If so, then the speech is not protected by the First Amendment.That's a better way to put it -- but you'd expect the U.S. Supreme Court to say things in a good-soundin', high-falutin' way, but it means the same thing: misleading commercial speech is not protected by the First Amendment.

So, based on that, I'd say
debt collectors have no First Amendment right to lie to you about whether they are licensed to practice in a state or not.And
that will wrap up
30 Days of Debt Collection, either two days early, or 77 days late, depending on how you count.